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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
RlCHARD ENRlQUEZ ORTEGA 
Danielle Quemada, Personal Representative 
of The estate of Richard Enriquez Ortega, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
EFREN A. ARlZMENDEZ, 
GILBERT ACOSTA, JR., 
Respondents. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 388341-2011 
Owyhee County Docket No. CV-1O-01389 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District for Owyhee County. 
Honorable Thomas J. Ryan, District Judge, presiding. 
Douglas E. Fleenor, Attorney for the Appellant 
702 W. Idaho St., Suite 1100 
Boise, ID 83702 
James M. Runsvold, Attorney for the Respondent 
PO Box 917 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
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3. Statement of Case 
Petitioner, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard Ortega, filed a declaratory 
action asking the court to find that two parcels of real property were taken from the decedent by 
undue influence or fraud, leaving the decedent, and therefore his estate with virtually no assets. 
The original Petition was filed at the Magistrate level as part of the probate proceedings. 
The Magistrate transferred the case to the District Court. Upon a hearing for summary judgment, 
the District Court ruled that Petitioner had not established her prima facie case and dismissed the 
Petition. 
The decedent, Richard Ortega ("Richard"), died on November 13,2009. R. Vol. I, p. 32, L. 
20. At the time of his death, Richard was single and had three children: Richard Ortega, Jr., Denise 
Mota and Danielle Quemada. R. Vol. I, p. 3 I, L. 8. Decedent married Celia Ortega in 1985 and 
separated in approximately 1999. R. Vol. I, p. 32, L. 9-11. Richard and Celia divorced on June 10, 
2009. R. Vol. I, p. 33, L. 10. Richard was a truck driver with less than a high school education. R. 
Vol. I, p. 34, L. IS. Celia was the owner of several rental properties and had purchased and sold 
several properties over the years. R. Vol. I, p. 34, L. 4-6. 
During Richard's marriage to Celia, Richard used his own funds from the sale of his pre-
marital house in California to purchase a home located at 2081 Hill Road in Homedale, Idaho 
("Richard's House"). R. Vol. I, p. 32, L. 13-15, R. Vol. I, p. 50, L. 6-7. Although Richard's House 
was purchased with separate property proceeds, he titled his home in his name and that of Celia, as 
husband and wife. Richard lived in this home while he was separated from Celia. R. Vol. I, p. 32, L. 
20-21. 
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During Richard's marriage to Celia, she purchased property located at 28901 EI Paso Road 
("Celia's House"). R. Vol. I, p. 32, L. 19. The property was titled in the name of Richard and Celia, 
as husband and wife. Celia primarily lived in between this house and a rental house on 6th Street in 
Nampa while she was separated from Richard. T. Gilbert Acosta, p. 12, L. 1-8. 
Sometime in 2008, Celia began having financial troubles and informed Richard that in order 
to protect his property from creditors, Richard's House, Celia's House and other three Rental 
Properties would have to be transferred from the name of Richard and Celia to Celia's son from a 
prior marriage, Gilbert Acosta. R. Vol. I, p. 51, L. 12-14, p. 87, L. 2-3. It is undisputed that Richard's 
intent in transferring the title to Richard's House and Celia's House was in order to allow each party 
to own their own house outright. R. Vol. I, p. 87, L. 3-4., T. Celia Ortega, p. 13, L. 20-25, p. 14, L. 
10-12, p. 16, L. 1-4, T. Gilbert Acosta, p. 15, L. 13-14. Cel ia testified that part of the reason for the 
transfer was so that Gilbert could "manage" the properties. T. Celia Ortega, p. 12, L. 1-13. Gilbert 
was unaware of such an intent. T. Gilbert Acosta, p. 21, L. 11-19. 
On December 30,2008, Richard and Celia Ortega executed quit claim deeds to Richard's 
House, Celia's House and three Rental Properties in favor of Gilbert Acosta. T. Celia Ortega, p. 11, 
L. 5-14. Celia admitted to preparing the quit claim deeds. T. Celia Ortega, p. 21, L. 7-10. It is 
undisputed that both Celia and Gilbert accompanied Richard when he executed the Deeds. T. Celia 
Ortega, p. 21, L. 5. 
It is undisputed that Richard did not have the benefit of independent advice with respect to 
the propriety of the transaction. If Richard had the benefit of independent advice, it is highly unlikely 
that he would have agreed to the transaction as the proposed method ran the risk, and in fact the 
transfer resulted in, his property being wrongfully taken. 
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Gilbert Acosta testified that both he and his mother held a close relationship with Richard at 
the time of the deed transfers. T. Gilbert Acosta, p. 8, L. 7-9, p. 10, L. 12-14. 
It is undisputed that Richard Ortega received no consideration for the transfer of his interest 
in Richard's House. T. Gilbert Acosta, p. 22, L. 8-11. Neither Celia nor Gilbert contend that the 
transfer of Celia's House and Richard's House was intended to be a gift to Gilbert. T. Celia Ortega, 
p. 15, L. 18-24, T. Gilbert Acosta, p. 22, L. 8-11. 
Shortly thereafter, Gilbert transferred the three Rental Properties back to Celia individually. 
T. Celia Ortega, p. 21, L. 19-25. However, Gilbert never transferred the title to Richard's House to 
Richard and never transferred title to Celia's House to Celia. T. Celia Ortega, p. 15, L. 10-24. 
Instead, in February 2010, Gilbert quit-claimed Richard's House to his brother Efren Arizmendez 
and claims that he was fulfilling Richard's desire to transfer the property to Efren's daughter, 
Desiree. T. Gilbert Acosta, p.17, L. 11-19, p. 22, L. 8-11. Celia Ortega never mentioned that the 
intent of the transfer of Richard's House was to give a gift to Desiree. In fact, Celia testified that she 
didn't know why Richard didn't get his house back as planned. T. Celia Ortega, p. 15, L. 18-24. 
Both Andy Avila, Richard's best friend, and Elizabeth Ortega, Richard's former spouse, have 
testified via affidavit that after the transfer, Richard believed that he owned Richard's House outright 
and that it was his intent to transfer Richard's House at his death to his daughter Danielle, to be 
distributed between his three children. R. Vol. I, p. 51, L. 1-3, p. 86, L. 9-10. Elizabeth Ortega 
testified that even in the summer and fall of2009, Richard believed that he was the sole owner of 
Richard's House. R. Vol. I, p. 86, L. 4-10. 
Mr. Avila testified via affidavit that Richard did not trust Efren or Gilbert. R. Vol. I, p. 51, L. 
4-5. 
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It is undisputed that Richard's House was the primary asset of the Estate and as a result of the 
transfer, the Estate's value has been diminished substantially. See a copy ofInventory as filed with 
the lower court, attached as Exhibit "A". 
4. Issues Presented on Appeal 
a. Whether the District Court erred in making inferences from disputed facts? 
b. Whether the District Court erred in not considering all the evidence in the 
records? 
c. Whether the District Court erred in failing to recognize a presumption of undue 
influence? 
d. Whether the District Court erred in not construing all disputed facts in favor of 
Appellant, the non moving party? 
5. Argument 
a. The District Court erred in making inferences from disputed facts. 
Although the Court correctly cited the standard for a motion for summary judgment where 
the court is the fact-finder, it appears to have misapplied the standard in this case. 
First, the Court is not permitted to make conclusive findings with regard to issues upon which 
the parties submitted conflicting evidence. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable 
Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 127,206 P.3d 481, 491 (2009); Williams v. Computer Res., Inc. 123 Idaho 671, 
673, 851 P.2d 967, 969 (1 993).(holding that the trial court was not permitted to draw inferences 
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regarding the parties' intent when the parties submitted conflicting evidence on the issue.) Moreover, 
the Supreme Court in Williams appears to limit the Riverside holding to cases where cross-motions 
for summary judgment exist. Williams at 673. In this case, cross-motions for summary judgment 
have not been filed. 
Moreover, in Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 192 P.3d 1036, (2008), which Respondents 
cite in their Summary Judgment Reply Brief, confirms that this standard only exists where there are 
uncontested facts, so the only thing left for the Court to decide is the inference from those facts. See 
Chavez at 218, 1042. Here, the facts with respect to Richard's intent are conflicting. Gilbert testified 
that Richard's intent was for Efren's daughter to receive Richard's House. Elizabeth Ortega and Mr. 
A vila testified that Richard's intent was for his own children to receive his home. 
It appears that the Court erroneously drew inferences regarding Richard Ortega's intent when 
the parties clearly submitted conflicting evidence on the issue. In fact, the Court even noted that "[i]n 
this case, the record is replete with conflicting testimony regarding the intent of the deceased and the 
purpose of the transfer." R. Vol. I, p. 100, L. 19-20. Thus, the Court erred in granting summary 
judgment where a question of material fact with respect to the decedent's intent and the purpose of 
the transaction exists. 
b. The District Court erred by not considering all of the evidence in the record. 
The trial court cites Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B. V, 148 Idaho 89, 218 P.3d 
1 150 (2009) as standing for the proposition that a trial court need not search the records looking 
for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material fact. However, that opinion in Vreeken 
was in response to a motion for summary judgment where the respondents in Vreeken had failed 
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to contest. Id. at 103, 1164. Instead, respondents in Vreeken argued that even though they had 
failed to point to evidence in the record, the trial court should have searched the record to find 
that evidence. Id. That Court held that a trial court is not required to search the record; instead, 
the evidence must be brought to the court's attention.ld. at 104, 1165. 
In the present case, facts indicating fraud and undue influence were brought to the trial 
court's attention, including the following: 
1. The transactions at issue herein were part of a larger scheme. Four other 
properties were transferred at the same time to Gilbert Acosta. Then, eight days 
later, Gilbert Acosta transferred three of the properties back to his mother. 
2. Celia had made several statements to Richard regarding the purpose for signing 
the deeds. 
3. Richard was an older man, was uneducated, his occupation was as a trucker, and 
had been involved in two real estate transactions during his lifetime. 
4. Celia was in the business of buying and managing rental properties as a source of 
income. 
5. The close relationships between Celia, Gilbert, and Richard. 
6. Celia was married to Richard at the time the deeds were signed. 
7. Celia had the deeds prepared and she and Gilbert took Richard to the title office to 
sign them. 
8. Gilbert benefitted from the deeds. 
9. Undisputed statements that Richard's intent in signing the deeds was for the 
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purpose of removing Celia's name from his property. 
10. Conflicting statements between Celia and her son, Gilbert, as to why Richard's 
house did not get transferred back to Richard. 
11. Gilbert's failure to follow through on his claim of Richard's intent in transferring 
Richard's house. 
12. Affidavit testimony that Richard's believed the house was still in his name. 
13. Richard's main asset was his home. The transfer left Richard impoverished. 
14. Affidavit testimony that Richard did not trust Gilbert. 
Unlike Vreeken, the Appellant contested the summary judgment motion and referenced 
the evidence contained in the Petition, Amended Petition, Affidavits, and Transcripts which were 
all in the record of the court. Therefore, the District Court erred in failing to consider this 
evidence. 
c. The District Court erred in failing to recognize a presumption of undue 
influence? 
McNabb v. Brewster states Idaho law as to presumption of undue influence in holding 
that when a grantor and grantee share a confidential relationship, and the facts and circumstances 
raise an inference of fraud or overreaching, a presumption of undue influence arises and the 
burden is cast upon the grantee to provide by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction 
was fair and just and free from fraud or undue influence. 75 Idaho 313, 320, 272 P.2d 298, 302 
(1954). 
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In McNabb, the court found the daughter breached her promised to care for the mother in 
exchange for property, which created an inference of fraud. The daughter also participated in the 
procuring the conveyance, which created an inference of overreaching. ld at 319-320, 301-302. 
Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823, 826, 606 P.2d 473, 476 (1980), later distinguished 
McNabb by citing the importance in McNabb of the property transfer leaving the grantor 
impoverished, and disinheriting her heirs. 
In Bongiovi v. Jamison, the trial court found facts in between Keenan and McNabb in that 
the conveyance in question were not based on a promise by the grantee and did not impoverish 
the grantor during his life, but did disinherit his adoptive step-mother contrary to his recent stated 
intention. 110 Idaho 734, 737, 718 P .2d 1172, 1175 (1986). 
The Idaho Supreme Court found the district court in Bongiovi had departed from McNabb 
by not giving an instruction that the presumption shifted the burden of persuasion. ld The Court 
then stated that the purpose for finding a presumption is to aid a contestant who lacks access to 
the evidence of contact between the grantor and grantee, and announced a new presumption rule 
which follows I.R.E 301. ld at 737-738,1175-1176. The Court then remanded and provided an 
example of how the presumption would work in an undue influence case as follows: 
If [ disinherited heir] introduced evidence sufficient to show that 
the [grantee] had a confidential relationship with [grantor] and 
participated in procurement of the conveyances, then the burden of 
producing sufficient evidence of the nonexistence of at least one of 
the four prima facie elements of undue influence would shift to the 
[grantee]. 
ld at 739, 1177. 
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This rule is followed by Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 575, 759 P.2d 77,81 (Idaho App. 
1988), an appellate level review of the effect of quit claim deeds in a divorce action. Krebs also 
cites Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1,492 P.2d 47 (1979), in listing factors for consideration when 
inferring improper influence, including whether the grantor received disinterested advice, the 
providence or improvidence of the decision, the amount of consideration received, the grantor's 
predisposition to make the transfer, the extent of the transfer in relation to the grantor's whole 
worth, active solicitation by the grantee, and the relationship of the parties. Id 
Krebs finds a husband and wife occupy a confidential relationship as a matter of law Id 
(citing 23 AMJUR.2D Deeds, 205 (1983). The court held the findings including that the grantee 
had prepared the documents, the grantor had not obtained independent counsel, and the grantor 
had received no consideration, invoked a presumption of undue influence. Id at 81-82, 575-576 
These courts recognized the Estate is in the difficult position of proving the elements of 
fraud and undue influence without access to relevant facts. Because of this position, Idaho 
Courts have, at least in a motion for summary judgment, imposed a presumption of undue 
influence where, 1) the grantee was in a confidential relationship with the grantor, as Celia and 
Gilbert have stated they were with Richard, 2) and the grantees participated in the procurement 
of the documents, which has been admitted by both Celia and Gilbert. This presumption shifts 
the burden of producing sufficient evidence of the nonexistence of at least one of the four prima 
facie elements of undue influence to Gilbert. Since no evidence of this kind was presented, the 
District Court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. 
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Further, similar to McNabb, where the court found a presumption of undue influence, 
Celia and Gilbert had a close relationship with Richard and helped in procuring the transfer 
documents, which creates an inference of overreaching. Unlike Keenan, the transfers left 
Richard without his main asset, thereby disinheriting his heirs. And like Krebs, where the court 
found a presumption of undue influence using several factors, Richard received no consideration 
for the transfers, the property transferred made up the bulk of Richard's estate, the transfers had 
been solicited by Celia, and a close relationship existed between Celia, Gilbert, and Richard. 
Additionally, Celia showed her disposition for fraud and exertion of undue influence by 
recording a deed without obtaining a signature from Richard. These factors combine to evidence 
undue influence, which precludes the intent required to execute a deed. Therefore the District 
Court erred in not finding a presumption of undue influence. 
d. The District Court erred in not construing all disputed facts in favor of 
Appellant, the non moving party? 
For summary judgment purposes, the intent of the grantor, Richard, is a matter of 
disputed fact. It is undisputed that Richard's intent was to have Celia's name removed from his 
property. Testimony from his wife, Celia, fails to mention any intent toward Desiree, but instead 
claims the transfers were accomplished so that Gilbert could manage the properties. However, 
Gilbert was unaware of a management arrangement. The Estate produced affidavit testimony 
from two witnesses who state Richard's intent was to pass his property to his three children. 
Since the disputed facts must be viewed in favor of the Estate, the District Court erred in 
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granting summary judgment because the intent of the grantor was not in conformity with the 
deeds. 
6. Conclusion 
Intent of the grantor is not only material, but is the primary fact when considering a 
transfer of property. Although the district court acknowledges the record contains conflicting 
testimony regarding the intent and the purpose of the transfer, it concludes that not enough evidence 
was presented to fulfill all of the elements for fraud or undue influence. 
The court erred in reaching this conclusion because it did not consider all of the facts in 
evidence, made inferences from disputed facts, failed to recognize a presumption of undue influence, 
and failed to construe the disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party. 
Therefore, the District Court's Judgment and Order Dismissing the Petition to Set Aside 
Deeds should be reversed. 
--'J .)-
Respectfully submitted this _~_ day of December, 2011. 
Dougla r 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
vfL 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the -Z day of December 2011, I caused true and 
correct copies of the foregoing to be forwarded with all required charges prepaid, by the 
methodes) indicated below, in accordance with the Idaho Appellate Rules, to the following 
person(s): 
James M Runsvold 
623 S. Kimball Ave., Ste. C 
PO Box 917 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
Bill R. Westmoreland, Jr. 
U.S. Bank 
17650 NE Sandy Blvd. 
Portland, OR 97230 
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[t{ U.S. Mail 
[ ] Certified Mail-Return Receipt Requested 
[ ] Fax - 459-0288 
[ ] By Hand 
rKU.S. Mail 
[ ] Certified Mail-Return Receipt Requested 
[ ] Fax-503-40I-5640 
[ ] B')!...aiiHH--I..':1 
v - 1"1 • ..I V. L V I I V I "T .J flj" 
Douglas E. Fleenor 
Burkett Law Office 
512 N 13th 
\JVlll\J 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone! (208) 344-2424 
Facsimile: (208) 344-3370 
ISBN 7989 
Attomeys for Personal Representative 
IIV. )V) I. L 
ElChibit A 
. . .~ .. ,- ' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF nIB TIllRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STAlE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR,TIlE COUNTY OF OWYHEE 
IN THE MAITER OF THE ESTATE OF CASE NO. CV-IO..Q1389 
INVENTORY RICHARD ENRIQUEZ ORTEGA 
Deceased. (I.C. § 15-3-706) 
The undersiilled, as Personal Representative of the estate of the above-named 
decedent, states and represents that: 
1. The schedules attached hereto constitute a full and complete inventory of the 
property owned by the decedent as far as the same has come to the possession or knowledge of the 
undersigned. 
I • • ... ;) .! : . t ! t • l~" ".. ~ \.. i ~. I I' \ • '( '. : l ! 
2. The values' set forth hi. such schedules are' the fair market values of the 
decedent's property as determined as of November 13,2009, the date of the decedent's death, by the 
undersigned. 
()M\JlUt J: ~~ 
Danielle Quemada " . 
Dated: U'" :00-\ l 
clo Burkett Law Office 
512 N 13th Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
208-344-2424 
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Schedule D -. 
ScheduleE -
Real Estate 
Inventory of Property of 
Richard Enriquez Ortega, Deceased 
Dated: June 30, 2011 
Recapitulation 
Stocks and Bonds 
Mortgages, Notes and Cash 
Other Miscellaneous Property 
Encumbrances 
TOTAL NET V ALDE 








Schedule A -- Real Estate 
Item No. Description 
1, Real Property located at 2801 Hill Road, 
Homedale, Idaho. 
Fair Market Value is listed at zero pursuant to 
judgment in the above case ruling that Real 
Property is not part of the estate. 
2. An undivided one half interest in real property 
located at 28901 EI Paso Road, Caldwell, Idaho 
Fair Market Value is listed at zero pursuant to 
judgment in the above case ruling that Real 
Property is not part of the estate. 
TOTAL 
Schedule B -- Stocks and Bonds 
Item No. Description 
None 
TOTAL 
Schedule C -- Mortgages, Notes, and Cash 
Item No. Description 
None 
TOTAL 











Schedule D -- Other Miscellaneous Property 
Item No. Description 
l. 2005 Chevrolet Silverado 
2. 1992 GMC 2500 with Six-Pac Camper 
3. Yellow chopper 
4. Trailer 
5. Riding Lawnmower 
6. Miscellaneous personal property 
TOTAL 
Schedule E -- Encumbrances 
Item No. Description 
1. US Bank Loan No. 03000609319, secured by 
real property at 2801 Hill Road in Homedale, 
Idaho. 
INVENTORY - 4 
Fair Market Value is listed at zero pursuant to 
judgment in the above case ruling that Real 
Property is not part of the estate. 
TOTAL 
Amount 
$18,500.00 
$1,500.00 
$600.00 
$300.00 
$100.00 
$0.00 
$21,000.00 
Amount 
$0.00 
